This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral incentive to deviate), balanced (if matched agents obtain similar benefits from collaborating), or Nash (both stable and balanced) outcomes. We design provably correct continuous-time algorithms to find each of these classes of outcomes in a distributed way. Our algorithmic design to find Nash bargaining solutions builds on the other two algorithms by having the dynamics for finding stable outcomes feeding into the one for finding balanced ones. Our technical approach to establish convergence and robustness combines notions and tools from optimization, graph theory, nonsmooth analysis, and Lyapunov stability theory and provides a useful framework for further extensions. We illustrate our results in a wireless communication scenario where single-antenna devices have the possibility of working as 2-antenna virtual devices to improve channel capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
N ETWORKED systems, characterized by distributed interactions among multiple components and across several layers, are pervasive in modern engineering problems and model various biological, economic, and sociological processes. Our motivation in this work is driven by resourceconstrained networks where collaboration between subsystems gives rise to a more efficient use of the resources. To this end, we view each subsystem as a player in a coalitional game where neighboring players seek to form a match (i.e., a coalition of size two) and split the corresponding transferable utility between the matched agents. Our aim is to synthesize distributed bargaining mechanisms that agents can employ to decide with whom to collaborate with and how to allocate the utility. Our interest in distributed strategies is motivated by the inherent limitations posed by the network structure, privacy concerns, as well as scalability and robustness considerations.
Literature Review: Examples of networked systems where performance benefits arise from agents cooperating with each other toward the achievement of a common goal are by now pervasive, see, for example, [2] , [3] and references therein. The list of applications is vast (e.g., communications [4] , irrigation [5] , power [6] , surveillance [7] , and transportation [8] ). Of particular relevance to this paper are scenarios where individual agents have the ability to carry out their objectives satisfactorily by themselves, but performance can be improved by collaborating with others. Examples are also numerous and include resource allocation in communication networks [9] , formation creation in groups of UAVs [10] , security [11] , large-scale data processing [12] , and applications in sociology [13] and economics [14] . Bargaining problems of the type considered here are posed on dyadic-exchange networks, so called because agents can match with, at most, one other agent [15] . Bipartite matching and assignment problems [16] are special cases of the dyadic-exchange networks. Nash bargaining networks are outcomes are an extension to multiplayer games of the classical two-player Nash bargaining solution [17] . The works [18] , [19] develop centralized methods for finding such outcomes. In terms of distributed implementations, the work [20] provides a discrete-time dynamics that, given a matching, converges to balanced allocations and [21] provides a discrete-time dynamics that converges to Nash outcomes (without considering dynamics separately for stable or balanced outcomes). With respect to these works, an important novelty of the present manuscript is the dynamics and control perspective on this class of problems, which allows us to develop a principled technical approach to the study of asymptotic convergence and robustness. Another area of connection with the literature is the body of research on distributed algorithms for solving linear programs [22] , [23] , including the authors' previous work [24] . Our algorithmic design to find stable outcomes is essentially an application of the distributed algorithm proposed in [24] , which we use because of its mild requirements for guaranteeing convergence and its robustness properties. Our distributed dynamics to find balanced outcomes, on the other hand, is completely novel.
Statement of Contributions:
We consider dyadic-exchange networks where individual agents bargain with one another about whom to match with and how to allocate the transferable utility associated with a matching. For this scenario, the type of outcomes we are interested in are Nash bargaining solutions, which combine the notion of stability and fairness. A stable outcome is one where none of the agents benefit by unilaterally deviating from their match. A balanced outcome is one where matched agents benefit equally from the match, where benefit is defined as the next-best allocation that an agent could achieve by a unilateral deviation. The main contribution of this paper is the design of provably correct distributed continuous-time dynamics that find each of these classes of outcomes. The problem of finding stable outcomes is combinatorial in the number of edges in the network. Nevertheless, we build on the correspondence between the existence of stable outcomes and the solutions of a linear programming relaxation for the maximum weight matching problem on the graph to synthesize a distributed algorithm that determines stable outcomes. Regarding balanced outcomes, we note how finding them requires each pair of matched agents to solve a system of coupled nonlinear equations. Based on this observation, we define local (with respect to 2-hop information) error functions that measure how far matched agents' allocations are from being balanced. Our proposed distributed algorithm then has agents adjust their allocations based on their balancing errors. Finally, we interconnect the two aforementioned dynamics to synthesize a distributed algorithm that finds Nash bargaining solutions. We show how the "stable outcome" part of the dynamics allows agents to guess in a distributed way with whom to match. Based on this prediction, the "balanced outcome" part of the dynamics asymptotically converges to a Nash outcome. As a byproduct of the systems and control perspective adopted here, we also assess the robustness properties of the proposed distributed algorithm against small perturbations. Our technical approach combines notions and tools from distributed linear programming, graph theory, nonsmooth analysis, and Lyapunov techniques. We conclude by applying our results to a wireless communication scenario in which multiple devices send data to a base station according to a time-division multiple-access protocol. Devices may share their transmission time slots to gain improved channel capacity. Simulations show how agents find a Nash outcome in a distributed way, yielding fair capacity improvements for each matched device and a network-wide capacity improvement of around 16%.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces basic preliminaries on notation, nonsmooth analysis, set-valued dynamical systems, and distributed linear programming.
Notation: We denote the set of real and non-negative real numbers by R and R ≥0 , respectively. For a set X ⊆ R n , its intersection with the non-negative orthant is denoted as X + := X ∩ R n ≥0 . This notation is applied analogously to vectors and scalars. For x ∈ R n , we use x ≥ 0 (respectively, x > 0) to mean that all components of x are non-negative (respectively, positive). We letS denote the closure of the set S. Given sets S 1 and S 2 , S 1 \ S 2 denotes the complement of S 2 in S 1 . A set S ⊆ R n is convex if it fully contains the segment connecting any two points in S. The set B(x, δ) ⊆ R n is the open ball centered at x ∈ R n with radius δ > 0. We use the shorthand notation S + B(0, δ) to denote the union ∪ x∈S B(x, δ). Given a matrix A ∈ R n×m , we let A i denote the ith row of A and a i,j its (i, j) element.
Nonsmooth Analysis: Here, we review some basic notions from nonsmooth analysis following [25] . A function f :
We refer to f simply as locally Lipschitz if f is locally Lipschitz at all x ∈ R n . A locally Lipschitz function is differentiable almost everywhere. Letting Ω f ⊆ R n be the set of points where the locally Lipschitz function f is not differentiable, the generalized gradient of f at x ∈ R n is
where co{·} is the convex hull and S ⊆ R n is any set with zero Lebesgue measure. We use ∂ x g(x, y) and ∂ x g(x, y) to denote the generalized gradient of the maps x → g(x, y) and y → g(x, y), respectively.
A set-valued map F : R n ⇒ R n maps elements in R n to subsets of R n . F is locally bounded if for every x ∈ R n there exists an > 0 such that F (B(x, )) is bounded. A set-valued map F is upper semicontinuous if for all x ∈ R n and ≥ 0, there exists
Given a locally Lipschitz function f : R n → R, the generalized gradient map x → ∂f (x) is a locally bounded and upper semicontinuous set-valued map. Moreover, ∂f (x) is nonempty, convex, and compact for all x ∈ R n .
Set-Valued Dynamical Systems: We present here basic notions on set-valued dynamical systems following the exposition of [26] . A time-invariant set-valued dynamical system is given by the differential inclusionẋ
where F : X ⊆ R n ⇒ R n is a set-valued map. If F is locally bounded, upper semicontinuous, and takes nonempty, convex, and compact values, then, from any initial condition, there exists an absolutely continuous curve x : R ≥0 → X (called trajectory or solution) satisfying (1) almost everywhere. The equilibria of F is {x ∈ X : 0 ∈ F (x)}. A set M is weakly positively invariant with respect to F if, for any x 0 ∈ M, M contains at least one maximal solution (i.e., one that cannot be extended forward in time) ofẋ ∈ F (x) with initial condition x 0 . The setvalued Lie derivative of a locally Lipschitz function V :
for all x ∈ R n , then V is nonincreasing along the trajectories of (1). The following result helps establish the asymptotic convergence properties of (1). Theorem II.1 (Set-Valued LaSalle Invariance Principle): Assume V : R n → R is differentiable, the trajectories of (1) are bounded, and F is locally bounded, upper semicontinuous, and takes nonempty, convex, and compact values. If L F V (x) ⊆ (−∞, 0] for all x ∈ X, then any trajectory t → x(t) of (1) starting in X converges to the largest weakly positively invariant set
Set-valued dynamical systems are a helpful tool in understanding the solutions of a differential equatioṅ
when f : R n → R n is discontinuous. Formally, let S f denote the set of points where f is discontinuous. Define the Filippov set-valued map F [f ] : R n ⇒ R n by
where co{·} denotes the closed convex hull. If f is measurable and locally bounded, then F [f ] is locally bounded, upper semicontinuousm, and takes nonempty, convex, and compact values. In such case, a solution t → x(t) of (2) in the Filippov sense is a solution toẋ ∈ F[f ](x). Distributed Linear Programming: Our review here follows the exposition in [24] and [27] . A standard form linear program is
where c ∈ R n , A n×m , and b ∈ R m . Its dual is
The point (x * , z * ) ∈ R n × R m satisfies the KKT conditions for (4) if
When (4) has a finite optimal value, x * (respectively, z * ) is a solution to (4) [resp., the dual (5)] if and only if (x * , z * ) satisfies the KKT conditions for (4).
We have proposed in [24] the following continuous-time dynamics to solve the linear program (4):
where the nominal flow function f :
The convergence properties of this dynamics are given next. Theorem II.2 (Convergence to a Solution of a Linear Program): Let t → (x(t), z(t)) be a trajectory of (6) starting from an initial point in R n ≥0 × R m . Then, if (4) has a finite optimal value, the following limit exists:
where x * (resp. z * ) is a solution to (4) [resp. the dual of (4)].
In addition to the asymptotic correctness of (7), here we mention two additional important properties of this dynamics: it is robust to disturbances (specifically, integral input-to-state stable) and amenable to distributed implementation. We elaborate on the latter next. Suppose that each component of x ∈ R n corresponds to the state of an agent. In order for agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to implement its corresponding dynamics in (6a), it needs access to the following data and states: 1) c i ∈ R, and every b ∈ R for which a ,i = 0; 2) the nonzero elements of every row of A for which the ith component, a ,i , is nonzero; 3) the states of every agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where a ,i = 0 and a ,j = 0 for some ∈ {1, . . . , m}; 4) every z for which a ,i = 0. The agents j for which a ,i = 0 and a ,j = 0 for some ∈ {1, . . . , m} (as in iv) above) are called neighbors of i, denoted as N (i). Also, the states z are auxiliary states whose dynamics can, based on locally available data and states, be implemented by any agent i for which a ,i = 0.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The main objective of the paper is the design of provably correct distributed dynamics that solve the network bargaining game. This section provides a formal description of the problem. We begin by presenting the model for the group of agents and then recall various important notions of outcome for the network bargaining game.
Let
is a vector of edge weights indexed by edges in G. In an exchange network, vertices correspond to agents (or players) and edges connect agents who have the ability to negotiate with each other. The set of agents that i can negotiate with are its neighbors and is denoted by N (i) := {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. Edge weights represent a transferable utility that agents may, should they come to an agreement, divide between them.
Here, we assume that the network is a dyadic-exchange network, meaning that agents can pair with, at most, one other agent. Agents are selfish and seek to maximize the amount they receive. However, if two agents i and j cannot come to an agreement, they forfeit the entire amount w i,j . We consider bargaining outcomes of the following form.
Definition III.1 (Outcomes): A matching M ⊆ E is a subset of edges without common vertices. An outcome is a pair (M, α), where M ⊆ E is a matching and α ∈ R n is an allocation to each agent such that α i + α j = w i,j if (i, j) ∈ M and α k = 0 if agent k is not part of any edge in M .
• In any given outcome (M, α), an agent may decide to unilaterally deviate by matching with another neighbor. As an example, suppose that (i, j) ∈ M and agent k is a neighbor of i. If α i + α k < w i,k , then there is an incentive for i to deviate because it could receive an increased allocation ofα i = w i,k − α k > α i . Such a deviation is unilateral because k's allocation stays constant. Conversely, if α i + α k ≥ w i,k , then i does not have an incentive to deviate by matching with k. This discussion motivates the notion of a stable outcome, in which no agent benefits from a unilateral deviation.
Given an arbitrary matching M , it is not always possible to find allocations α s such that (M, α s ) is a stable outcome. Thus, finding stable outcomes requires finding appropriate matching as well, making the problem combinatorial in the number of possible matchings.
Stable outcomes are not necessarily fair between matched agents, and this motivates the notion of balanced outcomes. As an example, again assume that the outcome (M, α b ) is given and that (i, j) ∈ M . The best allocation that i could expect to receive by matching with a neighbor other than j is Moreover, the set (possibly empty) of best neighbors with whom i could receive this allocation is
Then, if agent i was to unilaterally deviate and match instead with k ∈ bn i\j , the resulting benefit would be
When the benefit of a deviation is the same for i and j, the outcome is called balanced.
From its definition, it is easy to see that the challenge in finding balanced outcomes is that the allocations must satisfy a system of nonlinear (in fact, piecewise linear) equations, coupled between agents. Of course, outcomes that are both stable and balanced, called Nash, are desirable.
Definition III.4 (Nash Outcome): An outcome (M, α N ) is Nash if it is stable and balanced.
• Fig. 1 shows an example of each outcome. The problem we aim to solve is to develop distributed dynamics that converge to each of the class of outcomes defined above. We refer to a dynamics as 1hop distributed, or simply distributed, over G if its implementation requires each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} only knowing 1) the states of 1-hop neighboring agents and 2) the utilities w i,j for each j ∈ N (i). Likewise, we refer to a dynamics as 2hop distributed over G if its implementation requires each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} only knowing 1) the states of 1-and 2-hop neighboring agents and 2) the utilities w i,j and w j,k for each j ∈ N (i) and k ∈ N (j). As agents' allocations evolve in the dynamics that follow, the quantity w i,j − α i (t) has the interpretation of "i's offer to j at time t," thus motivating the term bargaining.
IV. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMICS TO FIND STABLE OUTCOMES
In this section, we propose a distributed dynamics to find stable outcomes in network bargaining. Our strategy to achieve this builds on a reformulation of the problem of finding a stable outcome in terms of finding the solutions to a linear program.
A. Stable Outcomes as Solutions of Linear Program
Here we relate the existence of stable outcomes to the solutions of a linear programming relaxation for the maximum weight matching problem. This reformulation allows us later to synthesize a distributed dynamics to find stable outcomes. We begin by recalling the formulation of the maximum weight matching problem on G. Essentially, this corresponds to a matching in which the sum of the edge weights in the matching is maximal. Formally, for every (i, j) ∈ E we use variables m i,j ∈ {0, 1} to indicate whether (i, j) is in the maximum weight matching (i.e., m i,j = 1) or not (m i,j = 0). Then, the solutions of the following integer program can be used to deduce maximum weight matching:
The constraints (8b) ensure that each agent is matched to at most one other agent. If m * ∈ {0, 1} |E| is a solution (indexed by edges in G) to the above optimization problem, then a maximum weight matching is well-defined by the relationship
Since (8) is combinatorial in the number of edges in the graph due to constraint (8c), we are interested in studying its linear programming relaxation
and its associated dual
The following result shows that the existence of stable outcomes is directly related to the existence of integral solutions of the linear programming relaxation (9) . Thus, the solutions of (9), (10) can be used to construct stable outcomes. The result appears in [18] without a formal proof, which for completeness we have made available in [28] . Lemma IV.1 (Existence of Stable Outcomes [18] ): A stable outcome exists for G if and only if (9) admits an integral solution. If a stable outcome (M, α s, * ) exist, then α s, * is a solution to (10) and the matching M is well-defined by
where m * ∈ {0, 1} |E| is a solution to (9) . It follows that M is a maximum weight matching.
B. Stable Outcomes via Distributed Linear Programming
There indeed exist graphs that do not have any stable outcomes. Nevertheless, a graph may be altered to yield a stable outcome by sufficiently scaling the edge weights of a maximum weight matching. From here on, we make the standing assumption that, when a stable outcome exists, the maximum weight matching is unique. Besides its technical implications (there is only one solution to (9) and it is integral), requiring uniqueness of the matching has a practical motivation and is a standard assumption in exchange network bargaining. For example, if an agent has two equally good alternatives, it is unclear with whom it will choose to match with. It turns out that the set of graphs for which a unique maximum weight matching exists is open and dense in the set of graphs that admit a stable outcome, further justifying the assumption of uniqueness of the maximum weight matching. Given Lemma IV.1 above, finding a stable outcome is a matter of solving the relaxed maximum weight matching problem. Our next step is to put (10) in standard form by introducing slack variables s i,j for each
We use s to represent the vector of slacks indexed by edges in G. In the dynamics that follow, s and m will be states. Thus, as a convention, we assume each s i,j and m i,j are states of agent min{i, j}. This means that the state of agent i ∈ V is
where, for convenience, we denote by N (i) := {j ∈ N (i) : i < j} the neighbors of i whose identity is greater than i. Next, using the dynamics (6) of Section II to solve the linear program above yields the following dynamics for agent i:
are derived from (7) . The next result reveals how this dynamics can be used as a distributed algorithm to find stable outcomes. Proposition IV.2 (Convergence to Stable Outcomes): Given a graph G, let t → (α s (t), s(t), m(t)) be a trajectory of (13) starting from an initial point in
where (α s, * , s * ) (resp. m * ) is a solution to (10) [resp. (9) ]. Moreover, if a stable outcome exists, the maximum weight matching M is well-defined by the implication
and (M, α s, * ) is a stable outcome. Finally, the dynamics (13) is distributed over G.
The proof of the above results follows directly from Theorem II.2, Lemma IV.1, and the assumptions made on the information available to each agent.
V. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMICS TO FIND BALANCED OUTCOMES
In this section, we derive distributed dynamics that converge to balanced outcomes. We assume that each agent knows if it is matched and with whom. Hence, the dynamics focuses on negotiating the allocations to find a balanced one. We drop this assumption later when considering Nash outcomes.
Our algorithm is based on the observation that the condition α b i + α b j = w i,j for (i, j) ∈ M and the balance condition in Definition III.3 for matched agents can be stated as
We refer to e b i , e b j : R n → R as the errors with respect to satisfying the balance condition of i and j, respectively. For an unmatched agent k, we define e b k = α b k . The vector e b (α b ) ∈ R n is the vector of balancing errors for a given allocation. We propose the following distributed dynamics where agents adjust their allocations proportionally to their balancing errors:
An important fact to note is that the equilibria of (15) are, by construction, allocations in a balanced outcome. Also, note that (15) is continuous and requires agents to know 2-hop information, because for its pair of matched agents (i, j) ∈ M , agent i updates its own allocation based on ba j\i . The following result establishes the boundedness of the balancing errors under (15) which we use later to show convergence of this dynamics to an allocation in a balanced outcome.
Proposition V.1 (Balancing Errors are Bounded): Given a matching M , let t → α b (t) be a trajectory of (15) starting from any point in R n . Then
is nonincreasing. Thus, t → e b (α b (t)) lies in a bounded set. Proof: Our proof strategy is to compute, for each i ∈ V, the Lie derivative of e b i along (15) . Based on these Lie derivatives, we introduce a new dynamics whose trajectories contain t → e b (α b (t)) and reason instead with the new dynamics. Since e b i is locally Lipschitz, it is differentiable almost everywhere. Let Ω i ⊆ R n be the set, of measure zero, of allocations for which e b i is not differentiable. If i is matched, say (i, j) ∈ M , then Ω i is precisely the set of allocations where at least one of the next best neighbor sets bn i\j (α b ) or bn j\i (α b ) have more than one element. If i is unmatched, then Ω i = ∅. Then, whenever α b ∈ R n \ Ω i , it is easy to see that for every i ∈ V,
This observation motivates our study of the dynamicṡ
for every i ∈ V, defined on R n × (R n \ Ω), where Ω := ∪ i∈V Ω i . Clearly, the trajectories of (17) contain the trajectories t → e b (α b (t)). That is, some trajectories t → ξ(t) are equivalent to e b (α b (t)) (likewise, some trajectories t → ω(t) are equivalent to t → α b (t)). For convenience, we use the shorthand notation F = (F 1 , F 2 ) : R n × (R n \ Ω) → R n × R n to refer to (17) . Note that F is piecewise continuous (because F 1 is piecewise continuous, while F 2 is continuous). Therefore, we understand its trajectories in the sense of Filippov. Using (3), we compute the Filippov set-valued map, defined on R n × R n , for any matched i and (ξ, ω) ∈ R n × R n , as
Here, we make the convention that the empty sum is zero.
Based on the discussion so far, we know that t → (e b (α b (t)), α b (t)) is a Filippov trajectory of (17) with initial condition (e b (α b (0)), α b (0)) ∈ R n × R n . Thus, to prove the result, it is sufficient to establish the monotonicity of V (ξ(t)) [with V defined as in (16) ] along (17) . For notational purposes, we denote
The generalized gradient of V is
where h i ∈ R n is the unit vector with 1 in its ith component and 0 elsewhere. Then, the set-valued Lie derivative of V along F [F ] is given in (19) , shown at the bottom of the next page. To upper bound the element in
where we have used the inequality ab ≤ (1/2)
, we can further refine the bound as,
Lie derivative (19) and noting that i∈Å(ξ) η i = 1, it is straightforward to see that for any element a ∈ L F [F ] V (ξ) it holds that a ≤ 0. It follows that t → V (ξ(t)) and thus t → V (e b (α b (t))) is nonincreasing and t → e b (α b (t)) lies in the bounded set V −1 (e b (α b (0))), completing the proof.
The next result establishes the local stability of the balanced allocations associated with a given matching and plays a key role later in establishing the global asymptotic pointwise convergence of the dynamics (15) .
Proposition V.2 (Local Stability of Each Balanced Allocation):
is a balanced outcome}. Then every allocation in B M is locally stable under the dynamics (15) .
Proof: Take an arbitrary balanced allocation α b, * ∈ B M and consider the change of
For brevity, denote this dynamicsF : R n → R n . We compute the Lie derivative of V (α b ) [with V defined as in (16) ] along F . The derivation is very similar to the one used in the proof of Proposition V.1
where Åisasdefinedin (18) .Consideroneofthe specific sum-
Now, according to Lemma A.1, there exists > 0 such that, for all (k, l) ∈ E, we have
Therefore, for such allocations, we have τ ∈ bn i\j (α b, * ) and κ ∈ bn j\i (α b, * ), and hence
where we have used the fact that α b, * ∈ B M in the second equality, the inequality ab ≤ (1/2)a 2 + (1/2)b 2 for a, b ∈ R in the first inequality and the fact that i ∈ Å(α b ) in the last inequality. Thus a ≤ 0 for each a ∈ LFṼ (α b ) when α b ≤ , which means thatα b = 0 is locally stable. In the original coordinates, α b = α b, * is locally stable. Since α b, * is arbitrary, we deduce that every allocation in B M is locally stable. The boundedness of the balancing errors together with the local stability of the balanced allocations under the dynamics allow us to employ the LaSalle Invariance Principle, cf. Theorem II.1 in the proof of the next result and establish the pointwise convergence of the dynamics to an allocation in a balanced outcome with matching M . Proposition V.3 (Convergence to a Balanced Outcome): Given a matching M , let t → α b (t) be a trajectory of (13) starting from an initial point in R n . Then t → (M, α b (t)) converges to a balanced outcome. Moreover, the dynamics (15) is distributed with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods over G.
Proof: Note that, for each pair of matched agents
converges to the set of (valid) outcomes. It remains to further show that it converges to the set of balanced outcomes. Following the approach employed in the proof of Proposition V.1, we argue with the trajectories of (17), which we showed contain the trajectory
under the dynamics (17) . Interestingly, this dynamics is independent of ω. Thus, using the Lyapunov function
it is trivial to see that L F [F ] V (ξ) = −2 V (ξ) which, again, is independent of ω. By the boundedness of t → ξ(t) established in Proposition V.1, and using V , we may apply the LaSalle Invariance Principle, cf. Theorem II.1, which asserts that the trajectory t → ξ(t) converges to the largest weakly positively invariant set M contained in
Incidentally, this set is closed already which is why we omit the closure operator. We next show, using the fact that t → V (ξ(t)) is nonincreasing (cf. Proposition V.1) and the weak invariance of M, that in fact M = {0}. Take a point ξ ∈ M ⊆ L and take an i ∈ Å(ξ). If i is unmatched, then ξ i = 0 already and the proof would be complete. So, assume (i, j) ∈ M for some j ∈ V. Then, ξ j = −ξ i and it also holds thatξ i = −ξ j [see, for example, (20) ]. In fact, it must be thatξ i =ξ j = 0, otherwise one of ξ i or ξ j would be increasing, which would contradict t → V (ξ(t)) being nonincreasing. If bn i\j (ω) = bn j\i (ω) = ∅ then 0 =ξ i = −ξ i = ξ j , which would complete the proof. Suppose then that τ = bn i\j (ω) and bn j\i (ω) = ∅. Then 0 =ξ i = −ξ i + (1/2)ξ τ , which contradicts i ∈ Å(ξ) (unless of course ξ i = 0, which would complete the proof). A similar argument holds if bn i\j (ω) = ∅ and bn j\i (ω) = κ. The final case is if bn i\j (ω) = τ and bn j\i (ω) = κ. In this case, 0 =ξ i = −ξ i + (1/2)ξ τ − (1/2)ξ κ . So as not to contradict i ∈ Å(ξ), it must be that ξ i = −ξ τ = ξ κ , which means that τ, κ ∈ Å(ξ) as well.
Therefore, using the same argument we used for i, it must be that 0 =ξ τ =ξ κ . Assume without loss of generality that ξ τ is strictly negative (if it were zero the proof would be complete and if it were positive we could argue instead with ξ κ ). This means that ξ τ grows larger at a constant rate sinceω τ = −ξ τ . At some time, it would happen that ω τ > w i,τ , which would make bn i\j (ω) = ∅. This corresponds to a case we previously considered where we showed that, so as not to contradict the monotonicity of t → V (ξ(t)) it must be that ξ i = 0. In summary, M = {0} ⊂ R n , so ξ(t) → 0. By construction of the dynamics (17) it follows that e b (α b (t)) → 0 which means, by construction of e b , that (M, α b (t)) converges to the set of balanced outcomes. This, along with the local stability of each balanced allocation (cf. Proposition V.2) is sufficient to ensure pointwise convergence to a balanced outcome [29, Prop. 2.2] . Finally, by (15) , the dynamics is distributed with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods, completing the proof.
VI. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMICS TO FIND NASH OUTCOMES
Here we combine the previous developments to propose distributed dynamics that converge to Nash outcomes. The design of this dynamics is inspired by the following result from [20] revealing that balanced outcomes associated with maximum weight matchings are stable.
Proposition VI.1 (Balanced Implies Stable [20] ): Let M be a maximum weight matching on G and suppose that G admits a stable outcome. Then, a balanced outcome of the form (M, α b ) is also stable, and thus Nash.
In a nutshell, our proposed dynamics combine the fact that i) the distributed dynamics (13) of Section IV allow agents to determine a maximum weight matching and ii) given such a maximum weight matching, the distributed dynamics (15) of Section V converge to balanced outcomes. The combination of these facts with Proposition VI.1 yields the desired convergence to Nash outcomes.
When putting the two dynamics together, however, one should note that the convergence of (13) is asymptotic, and hence agents implement (15) before the final stable matching is realized. To do this, we have agents guess with whom (if any) they will be matched in the final Nash outcome. An agent i guesses that it will match with j ∈ N (i) if the current value of the matching state m i,j (t) coming from the dynamics (13) is closest to 1 as compared to all other neighbors in N (i) \ j. As we show later, this guess becomes correct in finite time. Formally, agent i predicts its partner by computing
Clearly, P i (m) is at most a singleton and can be computed by i using local information. If P i (m) = {j}, we use the slight abuse of notation and write P i (m) = j.
With the above discussion in mind, we next propose the following distributed strategy: each agent i ∈ V implements its corresponding dynamics in (13) to find a stable outcome but only begins balancing its allocation if, for some j ∈ N (i), agents i and j identify each other as partners. Formally, this dynamics is represented by, for each i ∈ V
The state of agent i ∈ V is then
For convenience, we denote the dynamics (21) by
The dynamics (21) can be viewed as a cascade system, with the states m feeding into the balancing dynamics (21b). The next result establishes the asymptotic convergence of this cascade. Theorem VI.2 (Asymptotic Convergence to Nash Outcomes):
there exists a stable outcome, for some T > 0 the maximum weight matching M is well-defined by (i, j) ∈ M ⇔ P i (m(t)) = j and P j (m(t)) = i for all t ≥ T . Furthermore, t → (M, α b (t)) converges to a Nash outcome. Moreover, (21) is distributed with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods over G. Proof: Let m * ∈ R |E| be the unique integral solution of (9) . The asymptotic convergence properties of (13), cf. Proposition IV.2, guarantee that, for every > 0, there exists
Thus, taking < (1/2), it is straightforward to see that the matching induced by the implication (i, j) ∈ M ⇔ P i (m(t)) = j and P j (m(t)) = i is well-defined, a maximum weight matching, and constant for all t ≥ T . Then, considering only t ≥ T and applying Propositions V.3 and VI.1, we deduce that t → (M, α b (t)) converges to a Nash outcome. The fact that (21) is distributed with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods is trivial. Finally, we comment on the robustness properties of the Nash bargaining dynamics (21) against perturbations such as communication noise, measurement error, modeling uncertainties, or disturbances. A central motivation for using the linear programming dynamics (6) , and continuous-time dynamics in general, is that there exist various established robustness characterizations for them. In particular, using previously established results from [24] , it holds that (21) is a "well-posed" dynamics, as defined in [30] . As a straightforward consequence of [30, Th. 7.21] , the Nash bargaining dynamics is robust to small perturbations, as we state next.
Corollary VI.3 (Robustness to Small Perturbations): Given a graph G, assume there exists a stable outcome and let t → (α s (t), α b (t), s(t), m(t)) =: x(t) be a trajectory, starting from an initial point in X :
Then, for every > 0, there exist δ, T > 0 such that, for max i d i ∞ < δ, the maximum weight matching M is well-defined by (i, j) ∈ M ⇔ P i (m(t)) = j and P j (m(t)) = i for all t ≥ T , and t → (M, α b (t)) converges to an -neighborhood of the set of Nash outcomes of G.
VII. APPLICATION TO MULTIUSER WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
In this section, we provide some simulation results of our proposed Nash bargaining dynamics as applied to a multiuser wireless communication scenario. The scenario we describe here is a simplified version of the one found in [31] , and we direct the reader to that reference for a more detailed discussion on the model. We assume that there are n = 5 single antenna devices distributed spatially in an environment that send data to a fixed base station. We denote the position of device i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} as x i ∈ R 2 and we assume without loss of generality that the base station is located at the origin. Fig. 2(a) illustrates the position of the devices. An individual device's transmission is managed using a time division multiple access (TDMA) protocol. That is, each device i is assigned a certain percentage ρ i of a transmission period of length T in which it is allowed to transmit as specified in Fig. 2(c) . We use a commonly used model for the capacity c i > 0 of the communication channel from device i to the base station, which is a function of their relative distance
We have taken various physical parameters to be 1 for the sake of presentation. Since i only transmits for ρ i percent of each transmission period, the effective capacity of the channel from i to base station is ρ i c i . It is well-known in wireless communication [32] that multiple antenna devices can improve the channel capacity. Thus, i and j may decide to share their data and transmit a multiplexed data signal in both of their allocated time slots. In essence, i and j would behave as a virtual 2-antenna device resulting in a channel capacity of
which is greater than both c i and c j . However, there is a cost to agent i and j cooperating in this way because their data must be transmitted to each other. We assume that the device-to-device transmissions do not interfere with the device-to-base station transmissions. The power needed to transmit between i and j is given by P i,j = |x i − x j |. If P i,j is larger than some P max > 0, then i and j will not share their data. We model this scenario via (21) . At various times (i.e., t ≈ 4 and 9), certain devices change who they identify as partners in the matching which explains the kinks in the trajectories at those times. This occurs because of the evolution of the matching states in (b) and devices cannot correctly deduce the stable matching until t ≈ 9. The final convergence of the matching states to {0, 1} |E| (which we do not show for the sake of presentation) takes much longer than devices need to accurately identify a Nash outcome, which is shown in (c). a graph G = (V, E, W ), where V = {1, . . . , 5} are the devices, edges correspond to whether or not i and j are willing, based on the power requirements, to share data (i, j) ∈ E ⇔ P i,j ≤ P max and the edge weights represent the increase in effective channel capacity should devices cooperate, w i,j = (ρ i + ρ j )c i,j − ρ i c i − ρ j c j , ∀ (i, j) ∈ E. Fig. 2 (c) shows this graph, using the data for the scenario we consider. It is interesting to note that, besides channel capacity and power constraints, one could incorporate other factors into the edge weight definition. For example, devices may be less likely to share their data with untrustworthy devices which can be modeled by a smaller edge weight.
A matching M in the context of this setting corresponds to disjoint pairs of devices that decide to share their data and transmission time slots in order to achieve a higher effective channel capacity. An allocation corresponds to how the resulting improved bit rate is divided between matched devices. For example, if i is allocated an amount of α b i , then i and j will transmit their data such that i's data reaches the base station at a rate of c i + α b i . The percent improvement in bit rate for i is then given by α b i /c i . Devices use the dynamics (21) to find, in a distributed way, a Nash outcome for this problem. The simulation results are obtained using a first-order Euler discretization of the continuous-time dynamics with a stepsize of 0.01. Fig. 3 reveals the resulting state trajectories and the final Nash outcome. The percent improvements resulting from collaboration for each device are collected in Table I . The last row in this table show that the network-wide improvement is 15.8%. Before bargaining, devices 1 and 2 have the lowest individual channel capacities and would thus greatly benefit from collaboration. However, due to power constraints, device 1 can only match with 2, who in turn prefers to match with 3. This explains why, in the end, device 1 is left unmatched. Fig. 4 Fig. 4 . When the devices' dynamics are subjected to noise (normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation 0.01), the stable matchings are still correctly deduced and devices' allocations converge to a neighborhood of the allocations in the Nash outcome.
illustrates how convergence is still achieved when noise is present in the devices' dynamics (cf. Corollary VI.3).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have considered bargaining in dyadic-exchange networks, where individual agents decide with whom (if any) to match and agree on an allocation of a common good. For such scenarios, valid notions of outcomes include stable, balanced, and Nash. We have designed provably correct distributed dynamics that asymptotically converge to each of these classes of outcomes. We have illustrated the performance of the proposed coordination algorithm in a wireless communication scenario, where we showed how agent collaborations can, in a fair way, improve both individual and network-wide performance. Future work will include considering other solution concepts on dyadic-exchange networks and applying our techniques to multiexchange networks (i.e., allowing coalitions of more than two). We would also like to study the rate of convergence and establish more quantifiable robustness properties of balancing dynamics; in particular, the effects of time delays, adversarial agents, dynamically changing system data, and (opportunistic) sampled-data implementations of the continuous-time dynamics.
